Evaluation of Door-to-Door Tax Enforcement Strategy in Indonesia

Paulo Antonacci and Muhammad Khudadad Chattha

No 10901, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper presents an evaluation of a tax enforcement program conducted in Indonesia where officials from the tax authority visited properties to engage directly with owners about their property tax obligations. Through these visits, auditors explained outstanding debts and payment processes, aiming to improve tax compliance and revenue collection. The paper uses an administrative data set and a new set of machine learning–based techniques to assess the program’s effectiveness. The program was responsible for increasing tax compliance on the extensive margin by 4.3 percent and on the intensive margin by 5.1 percent in the first year it was implemented. These effects are particularly strong as they persist in the following period. The findings show that the visited properties had better compliance history, lower value, smaller area, and were more likely to have some construction on them. A key finding from the analysis is that higher-value properties are less sensitive to the visits. In other words, if a data-driven tax-enforcement strategy is to be applied, then it may focus resources on enforcing taxation at the poorest part of the population in this case. This opens up the discussion of the distributional consequences of an algorithm-based enforcement strategy, which is increasingly important as machine learning techniques are used by tax authorities.

Date: 2024-09-06
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