Tax Evasion and the Contribution-Benefit Link: The Case of Maternity Benefits

Anikó Bíró, Péter Elek, Daniel Prinz and László Sándor

No 11003, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper studies tax evasion and the contribution-benefit link in the context of maternity benefits in Hungary. Earnings and employment patterns suggest pre-pregnancy underreporting, followed by formalization of some earnings and employment during pregnancy to increase benefits. Reported earnings in small, domestic, and less productive firms bunch at the minimum wage before pregnancy and the benefit-maximizing threshold during pregnancy. Using a policy reform, the paper shows that the size of the reporting response tracks changing reporting incentives. Increases in pre-childbirth reported earnings are partially sticky after maternity leave. The results indicate that linking benefits to contributions can reduce tax evasion and improve formalization.

Date: 2024-12-16
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