EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Rules: Do Initial Conditions Matter ?

Antonio Fatas, Bram Gootjes and Joseph Mawejje

No 11066, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Fiscal rules have been shown to support fiscal discipline by improving government budget balances and restraining the growth of debt. However, questions remain about what enhances their effectiveness and how certain conditions help to build the credibility needed for their survival and success. Using data from 108 countries between 1984 and 2012, this paper studies the dynamic effects of fiscal rule adoption. It shows that although fiscal rules generally improve the primary balance, their effects depend on the time horizon under consideration and the context of adoption. In advanced economies and countries with strong political institutions, the effects strengthen over time. Conversely, in emerging markets and developing economies—especially those with weaker institutions—their impact tends to fade as time passes. The findings highlight the critical role of economic conditions and consensus building at the time of adoption. Specifically, fiscal rules introduced in times of economic hardship or under highly concentrated political power are often less effective in the medium term.

Date: 2025-02-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/0995104 ... e6f-55a175dadee5.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11066

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi (ryazigi@worldbank.org).

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11066