Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection

Girija Borker, Jan Eeckhout, Nancy Luke, Shantidani Minz, Kaivan Munshi and Soumya Swaminathan

No 11147, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.

Date: 2025-06-17
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