Circuit theory of finance and the role of incentives in financial sector reform

Biagio Bossone

No 2026, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The author analyzes the financial system's role in economic growth and stability, addressing several core policy issues associated with financial sector reform in emerging economies. He studies finance's role in the context of a circuit model, with interacting rational, forward-looking, heterogeneous agents. He shows finance to essentially complement the price system in coordinating decentralized intertemporal resource allocation choices made by agents operating with limited information and incomplete trust. He discusses the links between finance and incentives for efficiency and stability in the context of the circuit model. He also identifies incentives and incentive-compatible institutions for reform strategies for financial sectors in emerging economies. Among his conclusions: 1) Circuit theory features important methodological advantages to analyze the role of finance, and to assess structural weaknesses of financial systems under different institutional settings and in different stages of economic development. 2) Incentives for prudence and honesty can protect the stability of the circuit by directing private sector forces unleashed by liberalization. In particular: a) Financial institutions should be encouraged to invest in reputational capital. b) Governments should complement the creation of franchise value by strengthening supervision and by adopting a regulatory regime based on rules designed to align the private incentives of market players with the social goal of financial stability. c) Safety nets to reduce systemic risk should minimize the moral hazard from stakeholders by limiting risk protection and by making the cost of protection sensitive to the risk taken. d) Governments should encourage self-policing in the financial sector. e) Where information and trust are scarce, there is a potential market for them, and governments can greatly improve incentives for optimal provision of information. f) Governments should strengthen the complementarity between the formal and the informal financial sectors. Emphasizing incentives is not to deny the importance of good rules, capable regulators andsupervisors, and strong enforcement measures. It is to suggest that the returns on investments to set up rules, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms can be greater if market players have an incentive to align their own objectives with the social goal of financial stability.

Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Economic Theory&Research; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Environmental Economics&Policies; Financial Intermediation; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Intermediation; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-31
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