Information, accounting, and the regulation of concessioned infrastructure monopolies

Phil Burns and Antonio Estache

No 2034, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Economists often characterize the regulation of monopolies as a "game" (between the regulator and the service provider) in which the two players do not share the same information. The regulator is assumed to have poorer information than the service provider about the scope of future efficiency gains and the size and timing of future investment plans. Over time, the regulator must increase its information base so that regulatory targets become more realistic - but this is a costly process. The authors examine the ways such information can and should be generated, especially through the accounting requirements a regulator can impose on private operators of infrastructure concessions. (They view concessioning and regulation as complementary, not substitute, activities.) Concessionaires should provide regulators with the information they need to: 1) Compare outcomes with expectations. 2) Evaluate the cost of adverse shocks that may warrant relaxed regulations. 3) Evaluate whether lower costs than expected are the result of better performance or diminished output. 4) Properly evaluate the asset base and charge for the consumption of capital. Information that regulators get from private operators of infrastructure monopolies should be used to make both regulators and concessionaires accountable. In Chile, for example, the privatization of monopolies led to significant efficiency gains, but it took a long time for these gains to be passed on to users because neither the firms nor the regulators were held accountable - until Congress expressed reluctance to endorse further privatization because earlier waves of privatization had not benefited consumers. In other words, information should be used to make regulatory decisions more transparent and to reduce the risk of the private providers "capturing" the regulators.

Keywords: State Owned Enterprise Reform; Public Sector Administrative & Civil Service Reform; Energy Policies & Economics; Hydrology; Competition Policy; Privatization; Energy Privatization; Competitiveness and Competition Policy; Transport Services; Democratic Government; Economics and Finance of Public Institution Development; Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform; De Facto Governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/370791468765622333/pdf/multi-page.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2034

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().