Does"grease money"speed up the wheels of commerce?

Daniel Kaufman and Shang-Jin Wei

No 2254, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: If bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, a firm may find bribes a helpful way to cut through red tape. According to the"efficient grease"hypothesis, corruption can improve economic efficiency, and,fighting bribery can be counterproductive. This need not be the case. In a general equilibrium in which regulatory burden and delay can be endogenously chosen by rent-seeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery may be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys, the authors examine the relationship between bribe and payments, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. They find that firms that pay more in bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats, negotiating regulations. They also face a higher, not lower, cost of capital.

Keywords: Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Decentralization; Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics; Social Policy; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Governance Indicators; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT; Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (107)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (2000)
Working Paper: Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (1999)
Working Paper: Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (1999)
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