The optimal income tax when poverty is a public"bad"
Waly Wane ()
No 2270, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Abstract:
The author considers poverty as an aggregate negative externality that affects people in different ways, depending on their aversion to poverty. If society is on average averse to poverty, then the optimal income tax schedule displays negative marginal tax rates, at least for less skilled individuals. Negative marginal tax rates play the role of a Pigouvian earnings subsidy, fostering the supply of poor individuals to provide labor. The result of no distortion at the endpoints, which is therefore violated, can be restored once the focus is shifted from individual to social distortions.
Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Health Economics&Finance; Achieving Shared Growth; Safety Nets and Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01-31
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Journal Article: The optimal income tax when poverty is a public 'bad' (2001) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2270
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