EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

International cartel enforcement: lessons from the 1990s

Simon Evenett (), Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow

No 2680, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s, 24 lasted at least four years. And for the 20 cartels in this sample where sales data are available, the annual worldwide turnover in affected products exceeded $30 billion. National competition policies address harm in domestic markets, and in some cases prohibit cartels without taking strong enforcement measures. The authors propose a series of reforms to national policies and steps to enhance international cooperation that will strengthen the deterrents against international cartelization. Furthermore, the authors argue that aggressive prosecution of cartels must be complemented by vigilance in other areas of competition policy. If not, firms will respond to the enhanced deterrents to cartelization by merging or by taking other measures that lessen competitive pressures.

Keywords: Legal Products; Environmental Economics&Policies; Microfinance; Economic Theory&Research; Small Scale Enterprise; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Legal Products; Microfinance; Private Participation in Infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09-30
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC ... d/PDF/multi0page.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s (2001) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2680

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-22
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2680