The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution: concepts and country studies

Thorsten Beck

No 3043, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.

Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Insurance&Risk Mitigation; Financial Intermediation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Financial Intermediation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Insurance&Risk Mitigation; Insurance Law; Banks&Banking Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution: Concepts and country studies (2004)
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