Governance of public pension funds: lessons from corporate governance and international evidence

David Hess and Gregorio Impavido ()

No 3110, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector corporate world to public pension governance. The establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public pension funds, thus may be even more important than the maintenance of a comparable body for private sector corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be carefully designed.

Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Decentralization; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Banks&Banking Reform; Municipal Financial Management; National Governance; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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