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The quality of foreign aid: country selectivity or donors incentives?

Waly Wane ()

No 3325, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.

Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness; Decentralization; Poverty Monitoring&Analysis; Public Health Promotion; Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness; Banks&Banking Reform; Poverty Monitoring&Analysis; Health Economics&Finance; Health Monitoring&Evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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