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Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes

Jon Stern and John Cubbin

No 3536, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors review a number of studies on the effectiveness of utility regulatory agency and governance arrangements for the electricity industry, particularly for developing countries. They discuss governance criteria and their measurement, both legal frameworks and surveys of regulatory practice. They also discuss the results from econometric studies of effectiveness for regulatory agencies in the electricity and telecommunications industries and compare these with the results from econometric studies of independent central banks and their governance. The authors conclude with a discussion of policy implications and of priorities for information collection to improve understanding of these issues.

Keywords: National Governance; Banks&Banking Reform; Governance Indicators; Administrative&Regulatory Law; Municipal Financial Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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