Applications of negotiation theory to water issues

Carlo Carraro (), Carmen Marchiori and Alessandra Sgobbi

No 3641, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the"rules of the game"that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.

Keywords: Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions; Town Water Supply and Sanitation; Water and Industry; Environmental Economics&Policies; Water Conservation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Applications of negotiation theory to water issues (2006)
Working Paper: Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues (2005)
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