Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design

Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Edward Kane and Luc Laeven

No 3849, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect deposit insurance adoption and design. Controlling for the influence of economic characteristics and events such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development, they find that pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and power-sharing political institutions dispose a country toward adopting design features that inadequately control risk-shifting.

Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Economic Theory&Research; Financial Intermediation; Insurance&Risk Mitigation; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC ... ered/PDF/wps3849.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design (2008)
Working Paper: Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3849

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().