Policing unfair imports: the U.S. example

Joseph Finger and Tracy Murray

No 401, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper researched the numbers on U.S. import cases to find out how the Unites States uses antidumping and countervailing duty actions to regulate imports. It describes the procedures followed by the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission, surveys cases and outcomes in the 1980's and analyzes what drives the unfair trade laws. The pattern of petitions and results, it concludes, suggests strongly that injury to U.S. producers beset by import competition is whatthe antidumping and countervailing duty laws are about. That is why the pattern of antidumping cases is not particularly different from the pattern of antisubsidy cases - and why the frequency of cases against politically powerful countries is the same as the frequency of cases against politically weaker ones. The political strength of the exporting country does influence the form of import restriction the U.S. government will use. A powerful country will receive the courtesy of a negotiated settlement. A less powerful country will in due course receive determinations through normal administrative procedures. In short, unfair trade cases are where the action is because they are broad enough to handle all the action.

Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Trade Policy; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Economic Theory&Research; Rules of Origin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-03-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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