Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues: 2. application to natural and environmental resources

Stefano Zara, Ariel Dinar and Fioravante Patrone

No 4073, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.

Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Fisheries&Aquaculture; Common Property Resource Development; Economic Theory&Research; Ecosystems and Natural Habitats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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