Joint bidding in infrastructure procurement

Antonio Estache and Atsushi Iimi

No 4664, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive.

Keywords: Investment and Investment Climate; ICT Policy and Strategies; Markets and Market Access; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Access to Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pbe and nep-ppm
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Working Paper: Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement (2008)
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