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No more cutting class ? reducing teacher absence and providing incentives for performance

Frederic Rogers and Emiliana Vegas

No 4847, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Expanding and improving basic education in developing countries requires, at a minimum, teachers who are present in the classroom and motivated to teach, but this essential input is often missing. This paper describes the findings of a series of recent World Bank and other studies on teacher absence and incentives for performance. Surprise school visits reveal that teachers are absent at high rates in countries such as India, Indonesia, Uganda, Ecuador, and Zambia, reducing the quality of schooling for children, especially in rural, remote, and poor areas. More broadly, poor teacher management and low levels of teacher accountability afflict many developing-country education systems. The paper presents evidence on these shortcomings, but also on the types of incentives, management, and support structures that can improve motivation and performance and reduce avoidable absenteeism. It concludes with policy options for developing countries to explore as they work to meet Education for All goals and improve quality.

Keywords: Tertiary Education; Primary Education; Education For All; Teaching and Learning; Secondary Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-dev, nep-edu, nep-lab, nep-sea and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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