 Domestic purchase requirements for import license allocations in MaliNo 569, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank Abstract: This paper investigates the incentive system facing importers under a linking arrangement and their likely behavior. It analyzes the impact on imports, consumption, and domestic production and the social costs under the assumption that all the relevant"industries"(production of the product in the domestic market, importing and distribution) are competitive, in the sense that there are a large number of firms involved and nothing deters new firms from entering the market. It focuses on the interaction of the linking arrangement with price controls, because the products in question also have been subject to this additional regulation. The overlapping regulations pose problems of timing in the liberalization process. The paper also investigates the operation of the linking arrangements when domestic production is monopolized. The conclusion is that the ranking of the policy instruments as a means of obtaining certain objectives may switch if the domestic industry is not competitive. Keywords: Markets and Market Access; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Access to Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:569 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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