Children and intra-household inequality: a theoretical analysis
Ravi Kanbur
No 685, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Abstract:
Arguing that resources within the household are not allocated according to need, several researchers have tried to model intra-household allocative behavior. One group (1990) argued that as households become better off, intra-household inequality first increases then decreases. The behavior of intra-household inequality as household welfare improves is clearly important for policy, as interventions are often restricted to the household level - although the objective is to improve the welfare of the least-well-off individual. The author shows here that many of the tractable derivations of intra-household resource allocation are available in what might be called the"linear expenditure systems"framework. He analyzes the relationship between intra-household inequality and total household resources for models of intra-household allocation that lead to a linear expenditure reduced form. He then investigates three structural models : household welfare maximization; cooperative bargaining; and a noncooperative game with children as public goods. The author indicates how these models should be modified to produce reduced forms that are better represented in the evidence.
Keywords: Urban Housing; Poverty Lines; Environmental Economics&Policies; Inequality; Housing&Human Habitats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-05-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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