The role of regulation on entry: evidence from the Italian provinces

Francesco Bripi

No 7650, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of differences in local administrative burdens in Italy in the years 2005?2007 preceding a major reform that sped up firm registration procedures. Combining regulatory data from a survey on Italian provinces before the reform (costs and time to start a business) with industry-level entry rates of limited liability firms, it explores the effects of regulatory barriers on the average of the annual entry rates across industries with different natural propensities to enter the market. The estimates of the cross-sectional analysis show that lengthier and, to some extent, more costly procedures reduced entry in sectors with naturally high entry. A one-day delay in registration procedures reduces the entry rate in highly dynamic sectors by more than 1 percent. These results hold when I include measures of local financial development and of efficiency of bankruptcy procedures are included.

Keywords: Legislation; Social Policy; Regulatory Regimes; Legal Reform; Legal Products; Industrial Management; Judicial System Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-eur, nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Role of Regulation on Entry: Evidence from the Italian Provinces (2016)
Working Paper: The role of regulation on entry: evidence from the Italian provinces (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7650

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