Trade creation and trade diversion in deep agreements
Aaditya Mattoo,
Alen Mulabdic,
Michele Ruta,
Aaditya Mattoo,
Alen Mulabdic and
Michele Ruta
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michele Ruta,
Alen Mulabdic and
Aaditya Mattoo
No 8206, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Abstract:
Preferential trade agreements have boomed in recent years and extended their reach well beyond tariff reduction, to cover policy areas such as investment, competition, and intellectual property rights. This paper uses new information on the content of preferential trade agreements to examine the trade effects of deep agreements and revisit the classic Vinerian question of trade creation and trade diversion. The results indicate that deep agreements lead to more trade creation and less trade diversion than shallow agreements. Furthermore, some provisions of deep agreements have a public good aspect and increase trade also with non-members.
Keywords: International Trade and Trade Rules; Competition Policy; Competitiveness and Competition Policy; Trade Policy; Rules of Origin; Trade and Multilateral Issues; Regulatory Regimes; Judicial System Reform; Intellectual Property Rights; Social Policy; Legislation; Legal Products; Common Property Resource Development; Real&Intellectual Property Law; Legal Reform; Human Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (86)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade creation and trade diversion in deep agreements (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8206
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