Size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance: global evidence and aggregate implications

Pierre Bachas, Roberto Fattal Jaef and Anders Jensen

No 8363, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper studies the prevalence and consequences of size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance. The identification strategy uses the ranking of industries'average firm size in the United States as an instrument for the size ranking of the same industries in developing countries. Data on 125,000 firms in 140 countries show that tax enforcement and compliance increase with size. Size-dependence is more prevalent in low-income countries, and concentrated at the top of the size distribution. When quantified in a general equilibrium model, removing size dependent enforcement leads to gains in Total Factor Productivity of up to 0.8 percent.

Keywords: Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Public Sector Economics; Public Sector Development; Tax Law; Law and Development; Tax Administration; Economic Adjustment and Lending; Macroeconomics and Economic Growth; Macro-Fiscal Policy; Taxation&Subsidies; Labor Markets; Common Carriers Industry; Pulp&Paper Industry; Business Cycles and Stabilization Policies; Food&Beverage Industry; Industry; Textiles; Apparel&Leather Industry; Construction Industry; General Manufacturing; Plastics&Rubber Industry; Private Sector Development; Business in Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance: Global evidence and aggregate implications (2019)
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