Voice and Punishment: A Global Survey Experiment on Tax Morale

Fredrik Matias Sjoberg, Jonathan Mellon, Tiago Carneiro Peixoto, Johannes Zacharias Hemker and Lily Lee Tsai

No 8855, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: An online survey experiment spanning 50 countries finds sizable improvements in tax morale when (a) the salience of anti-corruption efforts is increased and (b) citizens are allowed to voice their expenditure preferences to the government. These results hold very broadly across a uniquely large and diverse sample of respondents from all continents. The findings are consistent with theories emphasizing the role of democratic accountability, as well as of perceptions of legitimacy and"retributive justice,"in generating voluntary tax compliance. Implications and avenues for further research are discussed.

Keywords: Tax Administration; Taxation&Subsidies; Macro-Fiscal Policy; Economic Adjustment and Lending; Legal Products; Judicial System Reform; Youth and Governance; Legal Reform; Legislation; Regulatory Regimes; Public Sector Economics; Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Government Policies; National Governance; Social Policy; Tax Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-law
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