Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors

Tito Cordella and Andrew Powell

No 8941, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI, that can commit to lend limited amounts at the risk-free rate and can refrain from lending into arrears is always repaid and adds value. The analysis suggests that IFIs should not mimic commercial lenders, but exploit their complementarity, even if banning commercial borrowing can sometimes be optimal. IFIs should also focus on countries with limited market access and should not be forced into debt restructurings.

Keywords: International Trade and Trade Rules; External Debt; Debt Relief and HIPC; Debt Markets; International Law; Legal Reform; Regulatory Regimes; Legislation; Social Policy; Legal Products; Judicial System Reform; Capital Flows; Capital Markets and Capital Flows (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Preferred and non-preferred creditors (2021)
Working Paper: Preferred and Non-Preferred Creditors (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8941

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