Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour and Daniel I. Rees

No 9126, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbent's political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.

Date: 2020-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-sea
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