Teacher Performance-Based Incentives and Learning Inequality

Deon Filmer, James Paul Habyarimana and Shwetlena Sabarwal

No 9382, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This study evaluates the impacts of low-cost, performance-based incentives in Tanzanian secondary schools. Results from a two-phase randomized trial show that incentives for teachers led to modest average improvements in student achievement across different subjects. Further, withdrawing incentives did not lead to a "discouragement effect" (once incentives were withdrawn, student performance did not fall below pre-baseline levels). Rather, impacts on learning were sustained beyond the intervention period. However, these incentives may have exacerbated learning inequality within and across schools. Increases in learning were concentrated among initially better-performing schools and students. At the same time, learning outcomes may have decreased for schools and students that were lower performing at baseline. Finally, the study finds that incentivizing students without simultaneously incentivizing teachers did not produce observable learning gains.

Keywords: Effective Schools and Teachers; Educational Institutions&Facilities; Educational Sciences; Public Sector Administrative&Civil Service Reform; De Facto Governments; Public Sector Administrative and CivilService Reform; Administrative&Civil Service Reform; Democratic Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-edu, nep-exp and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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