Containing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?: The Role of Deep Trade Agreements

Kevin Jean-Rene Lefebvre, Nadia Rocha and Michele Ruta

No 9637, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Regional trade agreements increasingly include provisions that regulate state-owned enterprises. This paper combines new information on the content of “deep” regional trade agreements and data on Chinese firm-level exports during 2000-11 to analyze the spillover effect of rules on state-owned enterprises on the intensive and extensive margins of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ trade. Rather than containing state capitalism, regional trade agreements regulating state-owned enterprises signed by Chinese trading partners with third countries increase exports and entry of Chinese state-owned enterprises as they gain a competitive edge in regulated markets. This spillover effect is robust to several extensions and is even stronger for agreements that include rules on subsidies and competition policy. This finding points to the need for commonly agreed multilateral rules to regulate state owned enterprises.

Keywords: International Trade and Trade Rules; Trade Policy; Competitiveness and Competition Policy; Competition Policy; Public Sector Administrative&Civil Service Reform; State Owned Enterprise Reform; Energy Privatization; Democratic Government; Economics and Finance of PublicInstitution Development; Privatization; De Facto Governments; Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-int
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Journal Article: Containing Chinese state-owned enterprises? The role of deep trade agreements (2023)
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