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When and Why do Domestic Respondents Oppose AD Petitions

James Cassing () and Ted To

CSGR Working papers series from Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick

Abstract: In the evolving global trade environment where traditional forms of protection have been falling as a result of multilateral trade agreements such as the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, antidumping policy has quickly become the protective policy instrument of choice. In the United States, there is evidence that domestic non-filing firms do not always support dumping investigations. In the absence of information asymmetries, domestic fims have an unambiguous incentive to support petitions filed by other domestic producers. We argue that in cases where the respondent is not a significant importer or exporter, the most plausible explanation is that non-support acts as a costly signal of private information.

Keywords: anti-dumping; signaling; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wck:wckewp:37/99

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