A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector

David D. Li

No 8, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: Can ambiguous property rights sometimes be efficient? Ambiguous property rights arises when owners' rights axe not guaranteed before hand. Instead, owners have to fight for actual control, ex pos. We show that China's highly successful non-state sector is a major example of ambiguous property rights. We then propose a theory of ambiguous property rights, which argues that ambiguous property rights arise due to an imperfect market environment. We argue that the immature market environment in China makes ambiguous property rights often more efficient than unambiguously defined private property rights.

JEL-codes: D23 O12 P21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1996-06-01
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