Ownership and Managerial competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership

Patrick Bolton and Chenggang Xu

No 174, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival firms provides adequate Incentive to perform for managers and employees. However, it is not entirely clear how ownership interacts with competition. This paper centers on the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect managers and employees' incentives to invest in human capital.

Pages: pages
Date: 1998-06-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership (2001)
Working Paper: Ownership and managerial competition: employee, customer, or outside ownership (2001)
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