Law, Relationship, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprise

Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell and Randi Ryterman

No 72, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: We examine how Russian enterprises do business with one another, focusing on the strategies used to obtain efficiency and predictability in their transactions. Using survey data, the paper analyzes the relative importance of relational contracting, self-enforcement, enterprise networks, private security firms, administrative institutions, and courts. Enterprise-to-enterprise negotiations are preferred, but courts are used when disputes resist resolution through negotiation. Consistently, little evidence suggests enterprises resort to private enforcement, indicating overstatement in the supposed connection between weakness in law and the mafia's rise. Legacies of the old administrative enforcement mechanisms are few, although enterprise networks from Soviet days remain resilient.

Keywords: law; contracts; transactions; contract governance; Russia; Transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K12 K40 L14 P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1998-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises (2000)
Working Paper: Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises (1998)
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