Property Rights Formation and the Organization of Exchange and Production in Rural China
Matthew Turner (),
Loren Brandt () and
No 250, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
Most exchange of farm land in rural china is conducted by local governments rather than by decentralized land markets. We investigate the forces determining the reallocation behavior of village governments, and hence the formation of the right "security of tenure". We also examine the relationship between administrative reallocations and market reallocation. Thes amounts to an examination of the choice between centralized and decentralized organization of agricultural production.
Keywords: property rights; Collective choice; Chinese Agriculture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:1999-250
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