Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation
Jenny Corbett () and
Janet Mitchell
No 290, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
Abstract:
This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalisation.
Keywords: banking crises; banking regulation; financial reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2000-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-pke
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp290.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp290.pdf [302 Found]--> https://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp290.pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Banking crises and bank rescues: the effect of reputation (2000)
Journal Article: Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2000-290
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 724 E. University Ave, Wyly Hall 1st Flr, Ann Arbor MI 48109. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WDI ().