Banking Passivity And Regulatory Failure In Emerging Markets: Theory And Evidence From The Czech Republic

Jan Hanousek and Gérard Roland

No 424, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: We present a model of bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks with low equity positions have more incentives to be passive in liquidating bad loans. We show that they tend to hide distress from regulatory authorities and are ready to offer a higher rate of interest in order to attract deposits compared to banks that are not in distress. Therefore, higher deposit rates may act as an early warning signal of bank failure. We provide empirical evidence that the balance sheet information collected by the Czech National Bank is not a better predictor of bank failure than higher deposit rates. This confirms the importance of asymmetric information between banks and the regulator and suggests the usefulness of looking at deposit rate differentials as early signals of distress in emerging market economies where banks' equity positions are often low.

Keywords: bank failures; bank supervision; Czech banking crisis; default risk; transitional economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C53 E58 G21 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2001-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd, nep-pke and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic (2002)
Working Paper: Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech republic (2002)
Working Paper: Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic (2001)
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