DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries

Yener Kandogan ()

William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: I carry out a power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty of the EU on the widening and deepening of European integration, by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decrease in voting power of small countries makes widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increase in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increase in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more in the coalitions they form, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist face for the EU in the way votes are distributed in Nice.

Keywords: EU; Voting Power; Integration; Enlargement; Federalis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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