The Economic Value of Regulated Disclosure: Evidence from the Banking Sector
No wp875, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
The study examines the economic consequences of regulated disclosure in the banking sector, focusing on its impacts on the stability of banking systems. In a cross-country study of banking systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with greater regulated disclosure and transparency. Specifically, banking systems are less vulnerable to crisis if supported by financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) more comprehensive disclosure (ii) more timely financial reporting (iii) more informative reporting, and (iv) more credible financial disclosure. To the extent that banking crises are costly, the paper documents the positive impact of accounting information to the real sector of the economy.
Keywords: Regulated disclosure; informativeness; timeliness; credibility; banking crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 M42 L51 G18 G21 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2007-875
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