The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

William Kerr (), William Lincoln () and Prachi Mishra ()

No wp1072, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confirmed in studying how firms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its in??fluence on firm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.

Keywords: lobbying; political economy; immigration; H-1B. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 F22 F23 J61 O31 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2014-01-01
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http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/132971/1/wp1072.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (2014)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wdi:papers:2014-1072

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