Broadband Internet: Open Access and Content Competition

Christiaan Hogendorn ()

No 2004-002, Wesleyan Economics Working Papers from Wesleyan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Broadband “open access” regulation mandates openness of conduits (e.g. upgraded cable television) to service providers (e.g. America Online), but policy discussion often suggests that the ultimate goal is openness to advanced content (streaming video, interactive e-commerce, etc.). We define two forms of regulation, open access and common carriage, and discuss when they are equivalent. We argue that they are quite different in local access broadband. We develop a systems model with free entry and competition in all three industry segments (conduits, service providers, and content) and examine how open access regulation affects the number of firms in each. We confirm the view that an open access requirement can reduce entry of physical conduits, and more surprising we also describe conditions under which it can reduce the amount of content available to consumers.

Keywords: open access; broadband (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L5 L9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-06
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