Public Versus Private Airport Behavior When Concession Revenues Exist
Achim I. Czerny ()
No 12-01, WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group from WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
This paper analyzes a congested airport that provides aeronautical services to airlines and concessions to retailers and car rental companies. The sum of retail demands inside and outside the airport area is fixed, while an increase of the passenger quantity increases car rental demand. It is shown that an increase of the per passenger retail profit can reduce the private aeronautical charge and the private car rental charge. By contrast, the effect of car rentals on the private aeronautical charge is ambiguous. The welfare-optimal passenger number and aeronautical charge are both independent of retail profit.
Keywords: Privatization; congestion; concessions; retail services; car rentals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D62 L93 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published Economics of Transportation, Volume 2, Issue 1, March 2013, Pages 38–46
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:whu:wpaper:12-01
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