Information Asymmetries and Remittance Recipient Income: A Field Experiment in Malawi

Kate Ambler and Susan Godlonton

No 2020-12, Department of Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics, Williams College

Abstract: A growing literature suggests that asymmetric information about migrant income may affect the remittance behavior of migrants. In this study we examine whether improving information about the economic status of recipients impacts migrant remittance decisions. In a sample of internal migrants and their remittance recipients in Malawi, we provide a randomly chosen half of migrants with information regarding the agricultural production of their recipients’ farmer clubs. We test whether this information impacts remittances sent immediately following information provision and over the next three weeks. We find no evidence that the information impacts remittances, but our estimates are imprecise.

Keywords: Labor Supply; Agriculture; Malawi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: This is a revised version of paper 2019-25.
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