From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers

Nikolaos Antonakakis, Harald Badinger and Wolf Heinrich Reuter

Department of Economics Working Papers from Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting.

Keywords: Council; Enlargement; Efficiency; EU; Member States; Power Index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E61 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers (2014)
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