EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets

Klaus Gugler and Florian Szücs

No 343, Department of Economics Working Paper Series from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Abstract: We exploit the regulatory environment in the Austrian pharmaceutical market to study the effects of price regulation on market outcomes and consumer welfare. We evaluate all mergers of drug producers in the 2009-2017 period and find that the coexisting regulated and unregulated markets were unequally affected. While M&A have substantially increased prices without regulation, particularly for price-inelastic products, prices did not increase under regulation. Instead, variety increased in regulated markets. Therefore, regulation can successfully mitigate the effects of market power: whereas M&A decrease consumer welfare absent regulation, the additional product variety increases consumer welfare in the regulated market.

Keywords: pharmaceuticals; regulation; market power; consumer welfare; pharma mergers; product variety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://research.wu.ac.at/en/publications/c14a9329-c606-44a7-948d-12307f992e74 original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets (2023) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wiw:wus005:44832642

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics Working Paper Series from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WU Library ().

 
Page updated 2024-03-31
Handle: RePEc:wiw:wus005:44832642