First-Mover Advantage in Best-Of-Series: An Experiment Comparison of Role-Assignment Rules

Oscar Volij Bradley J. Ruffle ()
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Oscar Volij Bradley J. Ruffle: Wilfrid Laurier University, http://www.wlu.ca/homepage.php?grp_id=13631&ct_id=
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oscar Volij () and Bradley Ruffle

LCERPA Working Papers from Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis

Abstract: Kingston (1976) and Anderson (1977) show that the probability that a given contestant wins a best-of-2k+1 series of asymmetric, zero-sum, binary-outcome games is, for a large class of assignment rules, independent of which contestant is assigned the advantageous role in each component game. We design a laboratory experiment to test this hypothesis for four simple role-assignment rules. Despite significant differences in the frequency of equilibrium play across the four assignment rules, our results show that the four rules are observationally equivalent at the series level: the fraction of series won by a given contestant and all other series outcomes do not differ across rules.

Keywords: experimental economics; two-sided competitions; best-of series; asymmetric game; psychological pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D02 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2014-09-30, Revised 2014-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-ind
Note: LCERPA Working Paper No. 2014-16.
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http://www.lcerpa.org/public/papers/LCERPA_2014_16.pdf
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Related works:
Journal Article: First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0081

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