US Open Skies Agreements and Unlevel Playing Fields

William Morrison ()

LCERPA Working Papers from Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis

Abstract: We examine the relationship between ‘Open Skies’ agreements (OSAs) signed between the USA and various countries or regions on these markets and the absence of a so called ‘level playing field’; i.e. the existence of subsidies and other forms of protection that advantage one nation’s airlines over those of co-signatories to an OSA. We argue that under an oligopoly market structure, strategic competition brought about by OSAs creates incentives to subsidize and/or protect domestic airlines. Such incentives are maintained or amplified by political lobbying efforts that bias civil aviation policies towards producer interests over wider measures of economic welfare. We report on financial aid and policies which have co-evolved along with OSAs and which have advantaged US airlines during the OSA period and which suggest that unlevel playing fields have been perpetuated and possibly made more unlevel during the era of OSAs.

Keywords: ‘Open Skies’ agreements; Strategic competition; Subsidies; Protection; Level playing field (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L93 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08-01, Revised 2017-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Note: LCERPA Working Paper No. 2017-7
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lcerpa.org/public/papers/LCERPA_2017_7.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0104

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LCERPA Working Papers from Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Glen Stewart ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).