Information, Adaptive Contracting, and Distributional Dynamics: Bayesian Choice, Bose-Einstein Statistics and the Movies

Arthur DeVany
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Arthur DeVany: Department of Economics and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, UCI.

Working Papers from University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Computable Economics

Abstract: Audiences discover what movies they like and spread the word. Information feedback produces Bose-Einstein dynamics in the motion picture box office revenue distribution. Information cascades generate box office `hits' (superstars) and `flops' (antistars). The revenue distribution evolves recursively over the `run' as a mixture of the `opening' and a stochastic competition among films. The motion picture run is decentralized, adaptive, and self- organizing: semi-stationary admission prices, local information, and contingency-rich contracts match the film rental price and the supply of theatrical engagements to demand.

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