A Comparison of Political Institutions in a Tiebout Model

Ken Kollman, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page
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Ken Kollman: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Postal: Ann Arbor, MI 48109
John H. Miller: Carnegie Mellon University, Social and Decision Sciences, Postal: Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Scott E. Page: California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Postal: 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125.

Papers from Carnegie Mellon, Department of Decision Sciences

Abstract: We construct a computational model of Tiebout competition. We show that the notion that Tiebout competition, as a result of enforcing efficiency, renders institutional arrangements unimportant does not preclude the possibility that political institutions may differ in their ability to sort citizens. In particular, institutions which perform poorly given a single location, may perform better when there are multiple locations because they allow for improved sorting. We demonstrate that insights from simulated annealing, a discrete nonlinear search algorithm, may explain this improvement.

Keywords: Tiebout Competition; Computational Models; Political Institutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-03-21
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