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What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction

Edward Glaeser and Anne Morrison Peihl

JCPR Working Papers from Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research

Abstract: This paper presents a model of prosecutors' decision-making processes in which prosecutors (both federal and state) internalize some of the benefits of reducing crime, but also carte about developing their own human capital. Since U.S. attorneys make their decisions first, they have the opportunity to take the cases that will further their human capital development, knowing that the local district attorneys will handle the other cases. Using two surveys on prison admissions, we find that defendants who are better educated, richer, married, white, have higher-paying occupations, and have less extensive criminals records are more likely to be incarcerated in the federal system. Conversely, state prisons are more likely to incarcerate individuals who are particularly likely to be difficult prisoners, despite the supposed advantages of federal prisons in dealing with the most dangerous criminals.

Date: 1998-04-01
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