Changes in Tracking Policy in Japan: Unintended Consequences of Detracking Policy

Takehiko Kariya and James E. Rosenbaum

IPR working papers from Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University

Abstract: This paper describes Japan's efforts to reform its high schools by eliminating the hierarchy among high schools, and we identify some unintended consequences of these reforms. We find that these reforms are associated with the defection of the most able students from the public schools and with the introduction of internal tracking within schools. In a nation which traditionally had mediocre private high schools and little internal tracking, we find that the prefectures which were most progressive in implementing reforms suffered the most serious flight of good students to private schools and the highest incidence of tracking within public schools. Moreover, those prefectures which have tried to reverse these reforms have found that the undesired outcomes have not abated. These reforms succeeded in creating greater equality among Japan's public schools, but they have led to a great increase in inequality between private and public schools and by an increase in internal tracking inside schools.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:nwuipr:96-27

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